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PENGGUNAAN ESOS SEBAGAI MEKANISMA PENYELARASAN 
KEPENTINGAN DI MALAYSIA: SUATU KETIDAKPADANAN 
ANTARA MASALAH DAN PENYELESAIAN 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Skim Opsyen Saham Eksekutif (ESOS) sering digunakan sebagai instrumen 
penyatuan kepentingan pengurus dengan pemilik (masalah agensi jenis I) terutama 
sekali kerana keserakan saham pemilikan. Namun kebelakangan ini pelaksanaan ESOS 
menjadi popular di kalangan firma yang mempunyai konsentrasi milikan yang tinggi di 
mana pemilik juga sebahagian daripada pengurusan (masalah agensi jenis II). Oleh itu, 
kajian ini bertujuan untuk memahami tujuan pelaksanaan ESOS dalam persekitaran di 
mana pemilik telah menjadi sebahagian dari pihak pengurusan dan tiada pemasalahan 
asimetri maklumat sepertimana berlaku dalam pemasalahan agensi jenis I.  
Dengan menggunakan kaedah matched pair, ia mengkaji penentu pelaksanaan 
ESOS, keputusan untuk memasukkan atau mengenepikan klausa retensi, prestasi firma 
selepas pelaksanaan, dan penggajian eksekutif terhadap 428 firms yang disenaraikan 
(214 pelaksana dan 214 bukan-pelaksana matched pair) di Bursa Malaysia. Secara 
keseluruhan, kajian mendapati keputusan untuk mengisu atau melaksanakan ESOS 
didorongi oleh gelagat moral hazard. Walau bagaimanapun, ianya diimbangi (secara 
lemah) dengan adanya pelabur institusi termasuk pihak kerajaan. 
Dalam kajian penentuan ESOS, hanya perubahan dalam saiz didapati penting 
dan selaras dengan teori, tetapi berkemungkinan kesan dari manipulasi pengurusan 
perolehan oleh firma. Firma milikan keluarga cenderung untuk melaksana ESOS 
berbanding firma jenis lain. Dapatan ini mempersoalkan motif sebenar firma milikan 
keluarga terutama sekali dengan konsentrasi milikan yang tinggi. Tambahan pula, firma 
milikan keluarga yang lebih cenderung untuk tidak memasukkan klausa retensi dalam 
ESOS memanjangkan lagi perdebatan. 
ESOS juga gagal sebagai pemangkin prestasi yang lebih baik selepas 
pelaksanaan dengan adanya pembuktian statistik yang tidak signifikan di antara 
pelaksana dan bukan-pelaksana. Akhir sekali, dari pembuktian kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa penggajian eksekutif tidak digunakan untuk memberi ganjaran kepada pengurus 
berdasarkan prestasi dan firma milikan keluarga lebih cenderung untuk memberi 
penggajian yang lebih tinggi berbanding firma jenis lain, seterusnya mengesahkan 
pembuktian sebelumnya. 
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THE USE OF ESOS AS INTEREST ALIGNMENT MECHANISM IN MALAYSIA:  
A MISMATCHED OF A PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Executive’ Share Option Scheme (ESOS) has always been used as an 
instrument to converge the interests of managers with that of the owners (type I agency 
problem) particularly when the share ownership is dispersed. However, of late ESOS 
adoption has been popular among the firms with high ownership concentration where 
owners are also part of the management (type II agency problem). Therefore, this study 
aims to understand the reasons for adopting ESOS in an environment where owners are 
already part of the management team and there is no information asymmetry problem as 
faced under the type I agency problem. 
Using matched pair methodology, it study determinants of ESOS adoptions, 
decision to include or exclude retention clause, firm’s post performances, and executive’ 
remuneration on 428 listed firms (214 adopters and 214 matched pair non-adopters) in 
Malaysian Bourse. Overall, the study finds that the decision to issue or adopt ESOS is 
driven by moral hazard behaviour, though this is balance (albeit only weakly) by the 
presence of institutional investors including the government. 
In determinants of ESOS study, only change in size is found to be important and 
in-line with the theory, but could be subjected to earning management manipulation by 
the firm. Family owned firms are likely to adopt ESOS than other types of firms. This 
finding question the ultimate motive of family owned firms especially in light of high 
ownership concentration. Moreover, family owned firms would incline not to include 
retention clause in the ESOS, fuelling the debate further. 
ESOS adoption also fails to be a catalyst for better post-performance as 
evidenced by non-statistical significance between adopters and non-adopters. Lastly, 
evidence from the study shows that executive’ remuneration is not being used to reward 
managers based on performances and family owned firms are likely to give higher 
remuneration than any other type of firms confirming the priori. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The introduction of Modern Corporation has marked a new era in 
managing business. Owner does not manage the business himself. Instead, 
professional managers are hired to do the job. The concept of multiple owners 
is also brought the fore, marking the new wave in conducting business. 
Traditionally, owners and managers are the same people. However, with the 
modern corporation philosophy, specialists (professionals) are running the 
business on behalf of the owners. Whilst the philosophy helps to overcome 
the lack of competency to manage the firm, it has at the same time brought 
new set of problem with it that is the agency problem. 
Agency problem arises when one party has more knowledge than the 
other and the behaviour cannot be directly observed or monitored at all times. 
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) points out, professional managers have the 
incentives to take on decisions that may not be in the best interest of the 
owners but may well maximize the utility of the decision makers (managers). 
In general, theory of the firm and agency theory contends that 
executives, acting as agents for owners, may pursue strategies to meet their 
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own utility rather than that of the owners. Therefore, to reduce agency 
problems there should be mechanisms that align and safeguard not only 
shareholders’ interest but also executives’ financial well-being. An example of 
a tool for interest alignments would be through Executive’ Share Option 
Scheme (ESOS). 
ESOS’ or ESOP’s usefulness as an instrument to align managers’ 
interest with owners is well documented in developed market. Examples of 
such studies on the field are those by Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bizjak, 
Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Bradbury, Ching, and Mak, 1999; Core, and Guay, 
2001; DeFusco, Johnson, Zorn, 1990; Ding and Sun, 2001; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Hillegeist and Penalva, 2004; John and John, 1993; Lee, 1991; 
Lins, 2000; Matsunaga, 1995; Mehran, 1995; Mehran,  Nogler  and Schwartz, 
1998; Murphy, 1985, 1986, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003; Palia, Cornett,  
Hovakimian and Tehranian, 2003; Pugh, Oswald, and Jahera, 2000; Yeo, 
Chen, Ho   and Lee, 1999; and Yermack, 1995. These studies almost 
conclusively find that ESOS can align the interest of executives and 
shareholders. Thus, lowering agency cost and problems provides better 
accounting, financial, as well as share price performances. In other words, 
ESOS or ESOP works the way it was intended to. For example, it solves the 
problem between managers and owners by making the managers share part 
of the consequences of their decisions. 
Although later literatures (see Bebchuk, Fried, and  Walker, 2002; 
Bebchuk, and Fried, 2004; Coulton, and Taylor, 2002; Defina, Harris and 
Ramsay, 1994; Gerety, Hoi, and Robin, 2001; Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 
2003; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; Izan, Sidhu, and Taylor, 1998; 
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Martin, and Thomas, 2005) began to question the usefulness of ESOS, the 
general feeling that ESOS works as part of the tool that solves conflict 
between managers and owners remains. 
Throughout this proposal the term ESOS and executives share options 
plans (ESOP, as it is widely known in most part of the world) are used 
interchangeably as they represent the same concept of offering eligible 
executives the right to purchase a fixed number of employer’s common stock 
at a predetermined price over a finite horizon. 
 
 
1.1 Background of Malaysian Corporate Sector 
The Malaysian capital markets are growing with the total capitalization 
of RM553 billion or 185 percent of GDP in December 1999 to 963 companies 
trading in 2004 with market capitalization stands at RM722 billions with 
nominal shares value of  RM233 billions (Bursa Malaysian, 2005 Annual 
Report). In 2000, the Malaysian Bourse (MB) or previously known as Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) had 757 listed firms in the first board 
compared to only 285 firms in 1990, with annual growth of 30 percent over the 
same period (Khatri, Leruth and Piesse, 2002). 
Malaysian corporate sector like corporate sectors in other countries in 
the region and other developing market is characterized by an insider system 
of corporate governance (as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2) where high 
level of ownership concentration, cross holdings and significant participation 
of owners in management are apparent (see; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 
2000; Lemmons and Lins, 2001, and Mitton, 2002 for references).  
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Table 1.1 
Controls of Publicly Traded Companies in Selected Country (20% cut-off) 
  
Widely held 
(%) 
 
 
Family firms 
(%) 
 
State owns 
(%) 
 
Widely held 
Financial (%) 
 
Widely held 
Corp. (%) 
Australia 65 5 5 0 25 
France 60 20 15 5 0 
Germany 50 10 25 15 0 
UK 100 0 0 0 0 
US 80 20 0 0 0 
Japan 79.8 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2 
Greece 10 50 30 10 0 
Hong Kong 10 70 5 5 10 
Singapore 5.4 55.4 23.5 4.1 11.5 
Malaysia 
 
10.3 67.2 13.4 2.3 6.7 
Source: for Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia; Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. (2000) and for Australia, 
France, Germany, United States, United Kingdom, Greece, and Hong Kong; La Porta. R., .Lopez de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., (1998)  
 
From Table 1.1, it is clear that Malaysian market, family ownership 
concentration (having more than 20 percents of firm shareholding) is apparent 
where more than 2/3 of listed firm in the KLSE falls into family’ firm category.  
Figures in Table 1.1 also substantiate claims that developed market 
ownerships are different to those in developing market. In the developing 
market, firm’ ownership are disperse and widely held by numerous 
shareholders and the environment is vice-versa in developing market. In the 
developing market, firm’ ownership is mostly held by either family members or 
state holdings. Due to differences in firm’ ownership environments, this 
phenomenon indicates that knowledge abstracted from developed market 
may not be directly applicable in developing market. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 1.2, due to pervasive cross holdings 
practice, a portion of large Malaysian firms are controlling more entities/firms 
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beyond their level of ownership in each firm (Khatri, Leruth and Piesse, 2002). 
For example Thillainathan (1998) reports that Tan Sri Halim Saad, CEO and 
the controlling shareholders of Renong have a personal direct stake of 23.5 
percent which in turn controlled UEM with an interest of 37.1 percent. 
Therefore, Tan Sri Halim Saad’s effective cash flow right was only 8.6 
percents (0.235 x 0.371), but he exercises total control over UEM. 
 
Table 1.2  
Means of Enhancing Control in Selected Country (20% cut-off) 
 
 
 
 
Owns > 20% 
Control  
(%) 
 
 
Pyramids with 
ultimate 
owners (%) 
 
Cross 
holdings  
(%) 
 
Controlling 
owner alone 
(%) 
 
Presence in 
Management 
(%) 
Australia 5 0 10 100 100 
France 20 100 0 75 5 
Germany 10 67 20 50 50 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 
US 20 0 0 100 75 
Japan 20 36.4 11.6 87.2 37.2 
Greece 50 0 0 70 60 
Hong Kong 70 39 50 75 86 
Singapore 55.4 55 15.7 37.6 69.9 
Malaysia 
 
67.2 39.3 14.9 40.4 85.0 
Source: for Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia; Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. (2000) and for Australia, 
France, Germany, United States, United Kingdom, Greece, and Hong Kong; La Porta. R., .Lopez de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., (1998)  
 
Moreover, a well-documented example of ownership cross holding or 
pyramiding business in Malaysia would be that of Arab-Malaysian Banking 
Group (Malaysia), which holds 44.5 percent of Arab-Malaysia Development 
Company. The pyramid also includes Arab-Malaysian Finance and Arab-
Malaysian First Property Trust and six other companies listed in KLSE 
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). Other pyramiding business structure 
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includes Berjaya Group, Sime Darby Group, Lion Group, and Hong Leong 
Group. It is foreseen that such tunnelling ownership structure would increase 
the total control capability in the hands of a few causing non-owner executives 
to be powerless in firms’ operation and decision making. 
These findings suggest evidence of ownership concentration in 
Malaysian corporate scenarios. Linking this finding with Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), shown in Table 1.3 that shows ownership concentration is undiluted 
overtime. The fact that the ownership concentration remains unchanged 
suggests that Malaysian corporate scenarios are dominated by undiluted 
family shareholding firms. Therefore, these findings would insinuate the 
proposition that firm’s wealth remains in the hands of a few.   
 
Table 1.3  
Malaysian Bourse top 5-shareholding percentage 
  
1996 Mean 
 
 
1997 Mean 
 
1998 Mean 
 
1999 Mean 
 
2000 Mean 
 
Top 5 
Shareholders (%) 
 
61.48 
 
61.57 
 
61.60 
 
61.63 
 
61.64 
Source: Haniffa, R. and Hudaib, M., (2006). 
 
In term of executive’s remuneration, typically Malaysian executive’s 
remuneration consists of cash, fringe benefits, and bonuses. However, over 
the years, there has been an increasing trend of over-paying directors and 
executives without justification. Eustace Gomez of Watson Wyatt (M) Sdn. 
Bhd. (in Nurani, Malaysian Business, August 1st – 15th, 2003) pointed out that 
Malaysian companies are paying fixed compensation far too high, thus driving 
up their total fixed costs. He added that the significant rise in compensation 
was due to bonus payment, while fees and salaries only rose slightly. In the 
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2002 Financial Year, Genting Berhad and Resorts World Berhad forked out a 
staggering RM86.2millions and RM47.6 millions respectively. Such lucrative 
compensation may be able to be justified by the net profit of both companies 
amounting to RM1.4billions. Nonetheless, also in 2002 Financial Year, 
Berjaya Group Holdings Berhad that suffers from RM651.6 millions in net loss 
pays a total of RM12.5 million for its director’s remunerations. 
The unique Malaysian corporate setting suggests a potential of 
conflicting interest between majority and minority shareholders as well as 
between agents and principals. Nonetheless, the scenario provides a good 
platform to study implemented tools for interest alignment mechanism.  
 
 
1.2 Moral hazard and incentives 
A moral hazard problem arises when the principal cannot observe 
agent's actions because; (1) there is a positive cost of monitoring agent's 
actions, and (2) he is not even able to perfectly infer agent's actions by 
observing the outcome because the agent’s actions do not completely 
determine the outcome. Traditionally, the literature argues that the latter 
phenomenon may result from the intervention of an unexpected random 
exogenous occurrence that has influenced the outcome, that is to say, it 
would be the consequence of some kind of windfall or misfortune and not a 
direct consequences of the agent's actions (Shavell, 1979). 
Principal therefore faces two difficulties. First, he cannot design 
contracts based on his observation of agent's actions because the cost of 
monitoring his actions is generally prohibitive. Second, the principal cannot 
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entirely predicate the contract on the outcome for two reasons. First, the 
principal is uncertain about the causality between the agent's action and the 
outcome. The next reason is because even if the principal would predicate the 
contract on his observation of the agent’s actions anyway, the agent would 
not sign the contract because he is risk neutral. This state of affairs prevents 
the principal from designing complete contracts that make agent's fee 
contingent on either his actions or the outcome of his unobserved actions. In 
other words, the principal cannot contractually assign to the agent full 
consequences of his actions. For instance, Kotovitz (1987) finds that agency 
theory identifies other causes to explain the incompleteness of contracts such 
as costs of writing detailed contingent contracts and costs of enforcement. 
Kotovitz (1987, pg. 549), defines moral hazard as “actions of economic 
agents in maximizing their own utility to the detriment of others, in situations 
where they do not bear the full consequences. Alternatively, or equivalently, 
do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete 
or restricted contracts, which prevent the assignment of full damages 
(benefits) to the agent responsible”. Therefore, the agent is able to engage in 
discretionary behaviors, that is to say, undertake actions that may undermine 
the utility of the principal. In other words, under such conditions, the agent 
may make decisions that are against the interest of the principal. 
Moral-hazard problems have been identified in various kinds of 
contractual relationships. Therefore, it is useful to present some examples to 
understand the concept of moral hazard and its implications in the contractual 
relationship. The first example is the relationship between a physician and his 
patient who is the principal. In this case, the physician is the agent of the 
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patient. The patient expects that her doctor will correctly identify and cure her 
illness. However, the principal is unable to monitor agent's efforts and the 
relation between agent's effort and the output is random. The random 
character of the relation between agent's effort and output can be explained 
by the fact that the output can result from other factors than agent's actions. 
The physician may prescribe a medication for the patient that does not cure 
her because of the medicine manufacturing defect. Therefore, the principal's 
problem is how she can induce the agent to take the best action to cure her. 
A second example that can illustrate the moral hazard problem 
proceeds from Arrow's (1971) work in the context of insurance. The insurer is 
the principal and the insured is the agent. The problem of moral hazard 
manifests itself in the fact that the "insurance policy might itself change 
incentives and therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company 
has relied." Shavell (1979) argues that "moral hazard refers to the tendency of 
insurance protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent a loss." In the 
context of car insurance, the insurer will see his expenses increase if his client 
drives his car carelessly or recklessly. In the same way, if the car driver does 
not look after his car (for example, if he does not regularly change his brake 
pads or monitor tire pressure), the possibility of incurring an accident 
increases. A moral-hazard problem exists because the insurer cannot always 
keep an eye on his client and a car accident may not necessarily be the 
consequence of his client's negligence. 
Another example is the credit relationship. One individual lends some 
money to another one, in return for a promise to repay that money at a future 
date. So long as there is a possibility of default, which can result from the 
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actions of the borrower, there is a moral-hazard problem since the lender 
cannot perfectly observe the borrower's actions. Hence, as it can be observe 
that there are many situations where moral-hazard problems can emerge. 
Agency theory literature and, in particular, principal-agent literature, 
focuses in its models on the contracting process and how informational 
aspects of moral hazard are integrated in a contract to minimize the costs 
associated with moral-hazard problems. The key elements in the principal-
agent literature are the structure of preferences of the parties to contract, the 
nature of uncertainty, and the informational structure in the environment. We 
consider the structure of preferences of the parties to contract as an 
informational aspect of the contract because the structure of preferences 
depends actually of the degree of risk aversion of the person themselves. 
And, the risk aversion is necessarily related to the fact that individuals are not 
evolving in a world of perfect and complete information. Traditionally, the 
literature assumes that the principal is risk-neutral while the agent is risk-
averse. However, some models assume that the principal is also risk-averse. 
The principal-agent literature shows that, to reduce moral-hazard 
problems and minimize costs associated with these problems, contracts must 
have a "carrots and sticks" format, Mirrlees (1997). As previously mentioned, 
the principal must induce the agent to take the most appropriate action that 
will maximize his expected utility. In order to do so, the principal must design 
a contract that balances incentives and risk sharing as well as rewards and 
punishments. The basic idea is to reward the agent when the desired 
outcome is relatively more likely due to his actions and penalize him if the 
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desired outcome is relatively less likely due to inappropriate action by him, 
Kreps (1990: 592-593) 
As a general conclusion of principal-agent models regarding to moral 
hazard problems, it generally focuses on technical aspects regarding structure 
of preferences, the nature of uncertainty and the informational structure of the 
environment [Holmstrom (1979); Shavell (1979); Grossman & Hart (1983); 
and Mirrlees (1999)] and examines how these aspects are affected when 
variations are introduced in the models. These variations can be found in the 
literature by Holmstrom (1982), (1999); Lambert (1983); and Radner (1985). 
Moreover, in term of management, moral hazard can occur when upper 
management is shields from the consequences of poor decision-making. This 
can occur under a number of circumstances, such as: 
 
• When a manager has a sinecure position from which they cannot be 
readily remove.  
 
• When a manager is protected by someone higher in the corporate 
structure, such as in cases of nepotism or pet projects.  
 
• When funding and/or managerial status for a project is independent of 
the project's success.  
 
• When the failure of the project is of minimal overall consequence to the 
firm, regardless of the local impact on the managed division.  
 
 (http://www.wikipedia.org/en/moral_hazard) 
 
Some examples of the above moral hazard occurrences in 
management resemble the very problem faced in Malaysian corporate 
scenarios. Given the greater ownership concentration and major shareholders 
becoming directors of their firms (as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), more 
of the conflict are between majority and minority rather than a conflict between 
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agent/s and principle/s as seen in the developed markets. Consequently, 
ESOS adoption may not be an appropriate solution for interest alignment 
given the local corporate scenarios. Hence, the very idea being highlighted in 
this study that is ESOS adoption is a firm’ management decision moral hazard 
rather than a tool of interest alignment. 
 
 
1.3 Agency Problem and Executive’s Compensations 
 An agency relationship defined as a contract in which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engaging another person (the agent) to take actions 
on behalf of the principal(s), which involves the delegation of some decision-
making authority to the agent. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross 
(1973) provide early formal analyses of the problems associated with 
structuring the agent’s compensation to align his incentives with the interest of 
the principal.  
Substantial attention has been devoted to developing a theory of 
agency which has resulted in two approaches, refers as the “positive theory of 
agency” and the “principal-agent” literatures. Although these approaches differ 
in many respects, nonetheless, both literatures address the contracting 
problem among self-interested individuals and assume that in any contracting 
relationship, total agency costs are minimized.  
Conceptually, there are two (2) types of agency problem faced by firms 
around the world. The first type of the agency problem is between principals 
and agents and is known as type I problem, and another is between majority 
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and minority shareholders and is known as type II problem. As Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) put it,  
 
‘‘… it deals with ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” 
 
 
The classic owner-manager conflict (type I agency problem) as 
described by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) can 
be mitigated by large shareholders’ greater incentives to monitor their agents. 
However, the type II conflict appears when large shareholders use their 
controlling position in the firm to extract benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. The problem becomes more acute in highly concentrated firms 
in which controlling shareholders at the same time are the managers who 
have power and ability to make decisions that will significantly affect minority 
shareholders.  
If the large shareholder is an institution such as a bank, an investment 
fund, or a widely held corporation, the benefits of control are diluted among 
several owners. Therefore, large shareholder’s incentives for expropriating 
minority shareholders are small and so are the incentives to monitor agents. 
Hence, the problem reverts to type I agency problem for those firms. 
However, as pointed out by Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), if the large 
shareholder is an individual or a family, it has greater incentives for both 
expropriation and monitoring, which are likely to lead to type II overshadowing 
type I agency problem as majority shareholders govern the firm fully through 
legal right as shareholders and mandate as firm’ executive. 
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Type I agency problem, which arises when decision-making is the 
province of managers who are not the firm’s owners (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), is typically the problem faced in the developed market. Under this 
condition, when both parties are utility maximizes, possibility occurs that both 
parties would try to maximize their own interest rather than having their 
interest align. Such a condition have been put fourth by Bearl and Means 
(1932) that have become a corner-stone in addressing separation of firm’ 
ownership. However, Type II problem is more apparent in developing market, 
such as in Malaysia, where high ownership concentration is well documented 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Khatri, Leruth & 
Piesse, 2002; and Mitton, 2002) and as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2.  
 
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that Malaysian 
firms in general are plagued by high ownership concentration and high 
occurrence of major shareholders being members of the board of directors. 
These features of Malaysian firms are in direct contrast with typically 
developed market firms with dispersed ownership and are managed by 
professional executives (who are not the owners of the companies). In the 
latter situation, the executives have incentives to pursue their own interests by 
maximizing their utilities instead of the firms’. Therefore, there is a pressing 
need for shareholders to converge the executives’ interest into theirs.  As a 
result, Executive Share Option Scheme (ESOS) is introduced to align both 
parties’ interest by making executives become a part of firms’ owner. In this 
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respect, ESOS is seen as a mechanism that enables executives to share the 
common objective of the shareholders. One example is maximizing firms’ 
value. Hence, adopting ESOS as a solution to the interest alignment 
mechanism makes a lot of sense when it is introduced under the condition 
similar to that in the developed market. 
Malaysia, with high ownership concentration and higher incidence of 
major shareholders being part of the management team, has a different set of 
agency problems all together. The main agency problem faced in Malaysia is 
in the form of a conflict of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders. When the major shareholders become members of the board, 
there have always been issues of whether the decisions undertaken by the 
board are in the best interest of minority shareholders. There is also higher 
likelihood that the major shareholders would incline to make decisions that 
favours or enriches them even if these mean at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
Since ESOS adoption is seen as being a solution to Type I agency 
problem (conflict between managers and owners), one cannot help but 
wonder if the same solution would work for Type II agency problem (conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders). Statistically, in Malaysia ESOS 
adoption is on the rise (as shown in Table 1.4) with a surge after the 
implementation of Capital Market Plan in year 2000. 
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Table 1.4 
ESOS First Time Adoption 1989 – 2004 
 
Adoption 
Year 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total 
 
First Time 
Adoption 
 
9 
 
9 
 
11 
 
9 
 
16 
 
3 
 
6 
 
12 
 
4 
 
2 
 
13 
 
41 
 
17 
 
28 
 
14 
 
20 
 
214 
Source: Investor Digest 1990 – 2000, respective firm’ announcement in KLSE Website 
(www.klse.com.my) 
 
It has been demonstrated earlier than Malaysian corporate scenario 
are faced with Type II agency problem and as ESOS is fast gaining popularity 
locally, questions remain as to if ESOS adoption really bridges the conflict of 
interest or is another respectful tool to strip wealth from minority shareholders. 
There have been instances where ESOS adoption is open to abuse. An 
example of that would be of YTL Corporation Berhad. In 1989, YTL’ board of 
directors and shareholders granted its’ top executives, who are also family 
members of YTL’s majority shareholders with 70 percent of the allocated 
ESOS shares (see this study data, Appendix C). The problem arises when the 
YTL’ board of directors are also its’ majority shareholders. Therefore, without 
justification, the adoption of ESOS not only would not resolve agency 
problems but also could lead to expropriation of minority shareholders, (in 
example, another form of agency problem). 
In the case of Malaysia, although ESOS has been adopted for the past 
two decades and has seen a rise in popularity in late 1980’s and mid 1990’s, 
there seems to be scarcity of literatures on the topic. Given the uniqueness of 
Malaysian corporate scenarios where shareholding concentration is relatively 
high and the significant presence of owner/manager in firms’ management, 
adoption of ESOS prompts curiosity of whether it has been initiated to its 
 17
intentions. Such as the case of Renong and UEM, both are ESOS adopted 
firms, where UEM bails out its financial ailing parent company (Renong) 
through purchase of 33 percent of Renong at premium. Much of the attention 
are focus on Tan Sri Halim Saad personal shareholding, CEO and the 
controlling shareholders of Renong.   
Tan Sri Halim Saad’s action over the matter is atypical given Malaysian 
corporate scenario. However it is the action of UEM board of directors that are 
in questions. The incident provides two important evidence of Malaysia 
corporate governance, firstly, majority shareholders have the absolute 
uncontested power to make firm’ decision to safeguard their interest at the 
expense on minority shareholders. And secondly, firm’ non-owners executive 
are powerless to protect the best interest of the firm and other shareholders. 
As most UEM’ top management team are ESOS recipient, their decision to 
bail out Renong causes UEM’ share prices to drop and with it, their ESOS 
share value (Malaysian ESOS is a full right common share). Such incident 
suggests that most Malaysian firms attempt to emulate the developed market 
in the development of executive’s remuneration practices without emphasizing 
the essence of ESOS as a tool of interest alignments.  
Since there is concern that ESOS could not resolve the conflict of 
interest in a Type II agency problem, the importance of ESOS as an interest 
alignment mechanism should also be investigated, including its structure. By 
scrutinizing the structure especially the retention period to exercise, which is 
at firm’ discretion, the findings could unveil the real intention of ESOS 
adoption and the influence of internal variables to it.  
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One of the reasons for issuing ESOS is to provide incentives for firms’ 
managers or executives to improve firm’s performance so that the interest of 
owners is well taken care of. Therefore, firm’s post adoption performance is a 
good indicator to gauge if the interest alignment objective is met. Reviews of 
prior studies suggest that in general ESOS post performance in developed 
markets having a short-term positive accounting and financial outcomes. 
However, there are studies that find there is no improvement or insignificant 
improvement post ESOS adoption. It is therefore vital that this study be 
carried out to ascertain the impact of ESOS adoption onto the firms’ post 
performance.  
Since ESOS is a part of the remuneration package, it would be 
incomplete if this study does not cover the cash remuneration especially in 
light of reports that despite financial difficulties and deteriorating returns on 
equity (ROE), top executive’ remunerations continue to grow (Hassan, 
Christopher, and Evans (2003) and Eustance Gomez (in Nurani, 2003).  
For these reasons discussed, investigating ESOS as a tool to mitigate 
agency problem in a Malaysian setting is not only interesting but also a must 
as much of existing information on ESOP is focused on developed markets 
data which may reflect the specific financial trading and business ownership 
environment in these markets (as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). 
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1.5 Objectives of the Study 
There have been very few empirical studies on executive’s incentives 
in South East Asia (SEA) region. Moreover, it has been well established in the 
literature that ESOS adoption is used to align the interest of managers with 
that of the owners (Type I agency problem). However, in an environment of a 
Type II agency problem, ESOS adoption causes concern that it may not 
resolve the conflict between majority and minority shareholders but rather a 
tool to siphon wealth from the minority shareholders. Therefore, the main 
objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of a possible 
mismatch between adopting ESOS and solving the conflict, given the 
Malaysian corporate environment. 
Regional study on the reason of why ESOS adoption took place can be 
traced to study in Singapore by Ding and Sun (2001). The study which also 
focuses on employee share options concludes that Singaporean investors 
view ESOP favourably. However, there is mixed evidence as to firms’ 
performances. Moreover, Yeo, Chen, Ho   and Lee (1999) also finds no 
evidence of improves performance post ESOS adoption.   
The main objective is translated into the following specific objectives; 
• to identify influential firm specific variables in determining decision 
to adopt ESOS in order to ascertain if the determinants are the 
same to those of western-based model, 
• to examine the ownership influence on a decision to adopt ESOS, 
and inclusions of a retention clause (minimum holding period), 
• to identify the determinants of retention clause inclusions, 
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• to document evidence if post ESOS adoption performance 
improves significantly compares to that of pre-ESOS adoption 
performances, 
• to study the determinants of executive’ remuneration, 
and 
• to examine possible remuneration discrepancies in ESOS adopting 
firms. 
 
 
1.6 Research Question 
Bearing in mind the unique Malaysian corporate scenarios plagued by 
type II conflict and the possible mismatch of the use of ESOS as interest 
alignment mechanism, this study intends to find answers to the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the characteristic of firms adopting ESOS in Malaysia? 
2. Are these characteristics differing to those identified by the western-
based studies?  
 
To address the issue of agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders, the study would also examine the following research question; 
 
3. Does ownership structure relate to ESOS adoption? 
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Literatures have advocated that and certain types of ownership have 
higher tendency to expropriate wealth, hence inclusion of retention clause is 
appropriate to combat such practice. Moreover, literatures also suggest that 
presence of growth opportunity would also induce inclusion of retention clause 
in the adopted scheme. Therefore, the following research question would also 
be studied: 
 
4. Does types of ownership and presence of growth opportunity 
influences inclusion of holding periods? 
 
As ESOS is noted to have a positive influence on firm performance, 
nonetheless, given the local corporate scenarios of block-holders influencing 
firm’s operation (as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), can ESOS overcome 
the obstacle? Therefore, the following research question is used to study the 
matter; 
 
5. Does adoption of ESOS produce better firms’ performances? 
 
In most cases, ESOS is only a part of total remuneration package. 
However, not all firms are adopting the scheme.  This gives the study an 
opportunity to document the differences in characteristics between ESOS 
adopters and non-adopters with regard to their remuneration. Hence, the 
following research question is deemed necessary to be highlighted: 
 
6. Are remunerations between adopted and non-adopter different? 
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a. What influences the determinants of executive’ 
remunerations? 
 
 
1.7 Contribution of the Study 
Since there is limited studies on ESOS adoption in an environment of 
high ownership concentration, this study contributes to the extend literature by 
demonstrating the theoretical mismatch between ESOS adoption and solving 
the agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Moreover, 
this study intends to provide evidence of potential (such as; adopting ESOS 
for the right reasons, inclusion of retention clause for interest alignment,  
improving post adoption performance, and executive’ remuneration 
determinants) wealth expropriation when the usual objectives of introducing 
ESOS are not met. 
To the best of the author knowledge, this study represents among the 
first study to be addressing the issue of ESOS adoption effectiveness in highly 
concentrated ownership. 
This study’s contributions are in the form of; 
1.  Documenting descriptive statistics on key financial ratio, and 
ownerships composition in all four (4) sections of sub-studies which 
include ESOS adoptions, structures (retention period), post-
adoptions performances, and firms executives’ remunerations. 
 
2. Investigating the adoption of ESOS by Malaysian companies. 
a. This study strives to provide answer and rationale to influential 
variables that lead firms to adopt ESOS. 
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b. Examines and proves the possible influence of firms’ ownership 
on adoption decisions. 
 
 
 
3. Investigating the prevailing ESOS structure (retention periods). 
a. Examine and document the existing ESOS structure and ratify 
influencing variables. 
 
4. Investigating the post adoption performance of ESOS adopting 
firms. 
a. Examine and compare ESOS adopted firms’ specific key ratios 
over observations periods. 
 
b. Examine and compare ESOS adopted firms’ specific key ratios 
with match- paired non-adopters firms. 
 
 
5. Investigating the determinants of executives’ remuneration in ESOS 
adopting firms. 
a. Examine the possible remuneration discrepancies in ESOS 
adopting firms. 
b. Provide empirical evidence on firms’ specific variables that 
influence executives’ remuneration in ESOS adopting firms.  
 
All of these sub-studies intend to answer the big question, if there is a 
mismatch between the adoption of ESOS and resolving the agency conflicts. 
Should ESOS be adopted for reason other than improving efficiency and 
solving the agency conflicts, this would indicate possible or potential wealth 
expropriation situation exist in Malaysia. Even if the idea is proven otherwise, 
this study still represent as on of the pioneering efforts to examine the 
usefulness of effectiveness of adopting ESOS in a highly concentrated 
ownership environment. 
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1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
This study focuses on all companies established in Malaysia and are 
listed in Malaysian Bourse (known then as KLSE). This study includes only 
companies that award their executive with ESOS for the first time between the 
periods of 1st January 1989 until 31st December 2004. Upon completing this 
study, several limitations have been identified. They are: 
1. This research only includes first time ESOS adopters over the past 
16 years due to data accessibility problem. Although this period 
may be adequate to generalize the impact of ESOS on Bursa 
Malaysia, a longer period of observation would be better.  
 
2. Data management has been a crucial part of this study and all effort 
has been put forth to ensure the available data are correct. 
Nonetheless, relying on KLSE’ publication Investor Digest as an 
initial source to identify adopting ESOS firms have proves to be 
inadequate. The problem aggravates when Investor Digest dropped 
ESOS announcements from companies’ announcements section 
starting from January 1999 edition.  
 
3. Closure of KLSE Public Library to mass public has caused 
grievance in collecting firms’ specific hard copies data prior to 1995 
period. It also causes a variable, percentage of independence 
directors in executive’s remuneration studies, to be dropped due to 
inaccessibility of information.  
 
